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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. J. ~~MC~~ CONE

Wash DC

Although Mr. ~~McCone~~ *John A.* has indicated he will not be raising any problems or issues, the Director may find the following of assistance:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortunately we have been successful in establishing very effective working relations with several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with CIA, there were two situations during the past year which had a significant bearing on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency that he had been trained as a Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau. We lodged very vigorous protest (re:). The *[S]* other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the aforementioned Board should be retracted because the communication included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were predicated on information which had been given to us by two top CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also "the Director of Central Intelligence" and in

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fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S. agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA. Set forth are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet leaders. This information has been most valuable to CIA in following developments particularly the differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced highly valuable information of use to CIA.

(GIMME) (S)

This is a highly sensitive penetration of the [Czech Intelligence Service]. His information [S] has significantly assisted CIA in obtaining a current picture of the [Czech intelligence] organiza- [S] tion.

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensitive [Czech] source, [Gimme], is [S] scheduled to return to [Czechoslovakia]. Arrange- [S] ments have been made to make him available to CIA.

FEDORA

Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence operations abroad. In addition, we have given the agency data pertaining to the organization and functions of KGB.

SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country, we have identified Soviet mail drops in other areas and we have given this valuable information to CIA.

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under agreed-to restrictions we have permitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite visitors in this country for the purpose of assessing their potential as sources when they return to their native countries.

CUBAN SOURCES

We have afforded CIA the opportunity to brief Bureau sources before such sources made trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to intercepted radio communications being utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau has been far ahead of CIA in identifying agents mentioned in the communications and has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

The Bureau has been very successful in identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing techniques. We have made this knowledge available to CIA.

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

TOPHAT

CIA did an excellent job of servicing drops in Moscow in this very sensitive case. This was done at considerable risk and was productive for us. [S]

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DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

There have been a number of instances where CIA operated Soviet double agents outside of the U.S. and then made these individuals available to the Bureau for use in the U.S. In this connection it is also noted that in our development of the sensitive sources, Fedora (KGB penetration) and Gimme (penetration of Czech Intelligence Service) CIA furnished valuable assistance. X [S]

VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE

Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that one of its employees had been contacted by the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we conducted investigation which led to the ouster of a Soviet official and very favorable publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE (IN MEXICO) [S]

Through surveillances and surreptitious entry, CIA produced valuable information in our investigation of [redacted] whom we since have doubled. [S]

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

CIA has been most cooperative in making defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA has made certain documents and equipment available to the Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory, at no cost, a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we gained access to an individual who subsequently became a valuable informant in the labor rackets field (NY 3936-C).

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ACTIVITIES [S]

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Information provided by a sensitive CIA source has been very useful in following the activities of [] agents in the U. S. [S]

POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO

JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

This is the National Security Agency employee who supplied information to the Soviets and who committed suicide in July of this year. We recently received information from our sensitive source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is particularly concerned about the possibility that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets information which led to the compromise of Oleg Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case has been raising questions concerning the effectiveness of security within U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress eventually may initiate some inquiry and he already has been informed that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking into the matter. Last week Mr. McCone asked Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security. McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning our careful screening of applicants and our strong administrative controls including inspections. It was emphasized that the Bureau always resolved security problems in favor of the FBI rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone was told that the key to the situation appeared to be tight screening and control procedures and the willingness to take prompt action.

COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE U. S.

In the Spring of this year, McCone brought up this matter before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently

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had a discussion with Mr. Belmont. Essentially, McCone is most interested in technical coverage of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc countries. He has left the impression that in his opinion such coverage could be expanded in the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence and more sources. Our coverage in this field at the present time is quite extensive. With regard to CIA, we have the understanding that if the agency desires particular technical coverage, we will give each request the necessary consideration.

ACTIVITIES [CS]

In the early part of this year, we initiated extensive investigation of the alleged [] [CS] agents in this country on the basis of data furnished to us by a sensitive CIA source. This source has informed CIA that [] has [CS] embarked on an extensive espionage program in the U.S. primarily designed to collect scientific data which will enable [] to hasten its [CS] development of a nuclear capability. We have disseminated the results of our investigation to CIA and we are continuing the handling of numerous leads. The information developed by us so far has failed to disclose any evidence that the [] are stealing any classified [CS] secrets in the U.S. The [] appear to be [CS] obtaining voluminous information available to the [] through normal contacts between [CS] [] officials and their counterparts in the [CS] U. S.

TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a drop [in Moscow]. The message included information [CS] concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany and Austria. We have given this data to CIA. In addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as June, 1963. The delay in obtaining the communication prevented us from getting into the Dunlap Case well before the subject committed suicide.

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CIA did not service the drop because our informant did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently did not use the signal in order to fully protect himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to service the drop until August because State Department adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to conduct any activity in Moscow. This position was taken by State because it felt that any operational activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. [S]

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to the U. S. under CIA control, feuded with the agency, left for England under British Intelligence control and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his return, he has met with the Attorney General and with McCone. He has been extremely critical of the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely valuable information for all U.S. agencies including the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past, Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The Director has made it very clear that he will not see Golitzyn.

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official of the Polish Security Service who defected in January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many complaints. He has communicated with the President, the Attorney General and has been in contact with a Congressman. He is slated to testify before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all failure to comply with his needs. We have had access to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of information. However, we have been most careful not to become involved in the feud between him and CIA. We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA any information received from Goleniewski which might be of assistance to the agency.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

For your information, McCone has found this Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was established several years ago by the Eisenhower administration then continued by President Kennedy. It is designed to periodically review foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The present chairman of the committee is Clark Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne. Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as this Board looking into his operations. There is some indication that his irritation arises from personal differences with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his government that he had been working for the Soviets. Wennerstrom was in the U. S. from 1952 until 1957 and was collaborating with the Russians while he was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage report" should be prepared on this case and he expressed the opinion that this should be the responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage, he was referring to an evaluation of all information which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S. We have taken the position that we will not prepare such a damage report and if one is needed the work should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the unknown Soviet agent. We do have a suspect, [John S. [CS] Barescu], who was born in Russia and who has been working for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this matter but he is very much concerned about the situation. We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent developments.

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